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Persistent negative thought is a hallmark feature of both major depressive disorder and 
generalized anxiety disorder. Despite its clinical significance, little is known about the 
underlying mechanisms of persistent negative thought. Recent studies suggest that 
reduced cognitive control might be an explanatory factor. We investigated the association 
between persistent negative thought and switching between internal representations in 
working memory, using the Internal Shift Task (IST). The IST was administered to a 
group of undergraduates, classified as high-ruminators versus low-ruminators, or high-
worriers versus low-worriers. Results showed that high-ruminators and high-worriers 
have more difficulties to switch between internal representations in working memory as 
opposed to low-ruminators and low-worriers. Importantly, results were only significant 
when the negative stimuli used in the IST reflected personally relevant worry-themes for 
the participants. The results of this study indicate that rumination and worrying are both 
associated with reduced cognitive control for verbal information that is personally 
relevant. 












Worldwide, major depressive disorder (MDD) and generalized anxiety disorder 
(GAD) are the most prevalent psychiatric disorders among primary care patients (Ormel, 
VonKorff, Ustun, Pini, Korten, & Oldehinkel, 1994). Although affective disorders show 
high relapse rates, current treatments are based on treating symptoms (post onset), rather 
than focusing on prevention. In order to develop preventive measures and effective 
treatment programmes, we need a better understanding of the causes and sustaining 
factors of MDD and GAD. One of the transdiagnostic characteristics these disorders have 
in common is persistent negative thought. In MDD, this persistent thinking is called 
rumination. Ruminative thoughts often deal with negative past events, such as failures, 
losses, etc., and focus on the origin, causes, and consequences of negative emotions and 
the symptoms of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). In GAD, on the other hand, 
thoughts are typically related to possible negative events in the future and strategies to 
prevent such events from occurring. This process is referred to as worrying (Borkovec & 
Inz, 1990).  
Although factor analysis has shown that rumination and worrying questionnaires 
target two distinct constructs, there is a strong correlation between both constructs 
(Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002), and the subtle difference in content 
remains debatable. For example, a substantial proportion of worrying is about past events 
(Molina, Borkovec, Peasy, & Pearson, 1998), whereas depressive rumination might just 
as well entail worrying about future implications of depressive symptoms (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). In accordance with several other authors (e.g. Muris, Roelofs, 
Meesters, & Boomsma, 2004; Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000; Watkins, 
Running head: PERSISTENT NEGATIVE THOUGHT AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
 
4 
Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005), we assume that worrying and rumination are similar 
cognitive processes described in a different research context. We will therefore use the 
term persistent negative thinking, with reference to both worrying and rumination.  
Besides having an adverse impact on affective states (McLaughlin, Borkovec, 
Sibrava, 2007, Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Purdon & Harrington, 2006), persistent negative 
thought has physiological implications such as increased cardio-vascular, 
endocrinological, immunological, and neurovisceral activity (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 
2006). However, despite the clinical significance of persistent negative thought, its 
underlying mechanisms remain poorly understood. The purpose of our study is to gain 
more insight into this matter by clarifying the interrelationship between basic cognitive 
functioning and persistent negative thought. We will therefore investigate the association 
between cognitive control and both worrying and rumination. 
An important potential underlying cognitive mechanism discussed in the context 
of anxiety and depression is a valence-specific attention bias. Several studies have shown 
that depressed persons have an impaired ability to divert their attention away from 
negative information (for a review, see De Raedt & Koster, 2010). This disengagement 
bias has been shown to be more pronounced in individuals who have a strong tendency to 
ruminate (Donaldson, Lam, & Mathews, 2007). Anxious persons, on the other hand, have 
been reported to have an attention bias towards threat-related material at earlier stages of 
information processing (for a review, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakersman-
Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 2007), and worry-induction seems to facilitate this bias 
(Oathes, Squillante, Ray, & Nitschke, 2010).  
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Importantly, recent research suggests that cognitive control impairments play a 
major role in the occurrence of both valence-specific attention bias and persistent 
negative thought (e.g. De Lissnyder, Koster, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2010). Studies 
investigating cognitive control generally distinguish between three factors of cognitive 
control: inhibition, shifting, and updating. Previous findings have successfully linked 
these different facets of cognitive control to rumination, but worrying is much less 
investigated. The inhibition function, i.e., the capacity to avoid interference by task-
irrelevant stimuli (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000), seems to be 
impaired in rumination (Whitmer & Banich, 2007), in particular inhibition of negative 
material (De Lissnyder et al., 2010; Joormann, 2006). Several researchers have therefore 
suggested that valence-specific inhibition impairments have a causal role in the increased 
elaboration of negative material in rumination (e.g. Hester & Garavan, 2005). In contrast 
to rumination, less research exists on the interrelationship between worrying and the 
inhibition function. This despite the fact that worrying has been theoretically linked to 
deficient inhibition by Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, and Calvo (2007), who put forward 
that inhibition impairments produce worrying in anxious individuals. An exception is a 
study by Brown (2009) indicating that worrying is indeed associated with an impaired 
ability to inhibit negative words. Because of this defective inhibition function, irrelevant 
negative material is suggested to enter working memory more readily. 
In contrast to the inhibition function, the updating function (i.e., monitoring 
incoming information in working memory by replacing no-longer-relevant information 
with new, more relevant information) and shifting function (i.e., the capacity to 
continually adjust our focus of attention towards the most relevant task stimuli) (Miyake 
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et al., 2000), have been far less investigated in experimental psychopathology research. 
One study by Joormann and Gotlib (2008) indicated that rumination is associated with 
increased interference from irrelevant negative material while updating the content of 
working memory. Other studies have shown a positive correlation between the tendency 
to ruminate and the number of perseverative errors on shifting tasks using non-emotional 
material (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Two studies using 
emotional stimuli found general (De Lissnyder et al., 2010) versus valence-specific (De 
Lissnyder, Koster, and De Raedt, 2012) impairments in students with a tendency to 
ruminate. The relationship between worrying and the updating and shifting function has 
not been studied directly. Since we anticipate that rumination and worrying are similar 
processes, we expect worrying to be associated with the same cognitive control 
impairments as those found in rumination. 
All studies to date have used pictorial stimuli (e.g. geometric figures and faces) to 
investigate the relationship between cognitive control and persistent negative thought. 
This is surprising, given the verbal nature of persistent negative thought. For this reason, 
we examined the association between cognitive control and persistent negative thought in 
the context of verbal instead of pictorial stimuli. To the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to investigate impaired cognitive control with verbal material. Since words are more 
open to interpretation than for example faces, we had to make sure that the negative 
verbal stimuli presented in the experiment had a negative connotation for the participants. 
For this reason the negative words in the experiment had to be personally relevant. We 
define personal relevance as negative words that are effectively related to themes our 
participants worry about. We did this in accordance with previous studies indicating that 
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people react more strongly to personally relevant stimuli (Oathes, Siegle, & Ray, 2011; 
Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 2003). We selected worry-themes based on a 
pilot study which revealed that respondents worried primarily about fear of failure and 
relationships. This is in accordance with other studies that have investigated worry 
domains (Brown, 2009; Stöber & Joormann, 2001; Tallis, Eysenck, & Mathews, 1992). 
Using negative words related to these themes also enabled us to examine whether 
cognitive control impairments occur in ruminators and worriers in general, or only in 
those for whom these themes are relevant. 
It is important to note that cognitive research within this domain generally uses 
experimental paradigms that measure the capacity to switch attention between external 
stimuli. However, especially the ability to control internal negative information could be 
an important process underlying persistent negative thought. Therefore, we adopted a 
paradigm that measures the capacity to switch attention between internal representations 
in working memory, i.e., the Internal Shift Task (IST; Garavan, 1998; Chambers, Lo, & 
Allen, 2008). A psychometric evaluation of the IST with emotional facial expressions by 
De Lissnyder, Koster, and De Raedt (submitted) indicated that the IST is a reliable task 
for measuring the Internal Switching Cost (ISC), i.e., the difference in RT between 
switch and no-switch (or repeat) sequences (Monsell, 2003). However, note that the IST 
does not provide a ‘pure’ measure of switching. Framed in terms of functional task 
demands, participants have to switch between internal representations held in working 
memory, and the IST provides a behavioral measure of this cognitive control operation. 
Like many tasks used in the context of executive functions and cognitive control, 
performance on the IST is dependent on multiple cognitive operations (Greve, Stickle, 
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Love, Bianchini, & Stanford, 2005). Therefore, we frame IST performance in general 
terms of cognitive control instead of further specifying its separate components. In a 
recent study, De Lissnyder et al. (2012) examined the ISC in dysphoric students and 
students with a tendency to ruminate, using the IST with pictorial stimuli (photographs of 
angry versus neutral faces). The main finding was that depression was not related to 
reduced cognitive control, though rumination was. Moreover, the cognitive control 
impairments for ruminators were most pronounced when negative information was held 
in working memory (De Lissnyder et al., 2012). In the current study, we aimed to 
determine whether rumination was associated with (the same) cognitive control deficits 
when verbal instead of pictorial stimuli were used, and whether worriers exhibited similar 
cognitive control deficits as ruminators. 
To recapitulate, the purpose of the present study was to investigate whether 
worrying and rumination are associated with reduced cognitive control, and whether this 




84 students (56 women and 28 men), with an average age of 19 years (SD = 2.39) 
were selected from a sample of undergraduates (N = 310) who were taking an 
introductory psychology course. The selection was based on their scores on the Penn-
State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) and the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS): only 
students with scores in the top 10% (high-worriers and high-ruminators) and the bottom 
10% (low-worriers and low-ruminators) of scores participated in the actual study. The 
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negative words we used in the IST were selected according to two themes: fear of failure 
and relationships. To make sure these words had a negative connotation for the 
participants, we only included participants who indicated they worried about fear of 
failure and relationships, leaving a group of 62 participants (out of this group of 84 
students). As we performed analyses on rumination and worry in the same overall sample 
based on high versus low scores, there was an overlap of 38.71% between the individuals 
in the worry and rumination groups: 14 participants with high scores on both the PSWQ 
and the RRS and 10 participants with low scores on both the PSWQ and the RRS, on a 
total of 62 participants. There was also a positive correlation between the scores on the 
PSWQ and RRS, r = .55, p < .001. For additional details on the separate rumination and 
worry groups, see results section below. The study was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB). 
 
2.2. Material 
2.2.1. Self- Report Questionnaires  
The Penn-State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ). The PSWQ (Meyer, Miller, 
Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Authorized Dutch Version: Van Rijsoort, Vervaeke, & 
Emmelkamp, 1997) is a 16-item questionnaire that assesses the tendency to worry. The 
items are rated on a 5-point scale for the degree to which they characterize the 
participant. The Dutch version of the PSWQ has an adequate reliability and high internal 
consistency (Kerkhof, Hermans, Figee, Laeremans, Peters,et al., 2000; Van Rijsoort, 
Emmelkamp, &Vervaeke, 1999).  
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The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS). The RRS (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema 2003; Authorized Dutch Version: Raes, Schoofs, Hoes, Hermans, Van Den 
Eede, & Franck, 2009) consists of items measuring the tendency to ruminate when in a 
depressed mood. Each item is rated on a 4-point scale (‘almost never’ to ‘almost 
always’). A study by Raes et al. (2009) showed that the Dutch version of the RRS with 
26 items has adequate reliability and good validity. 
 
The State –Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI). The STAI (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983; Authorized Dutch Version: Van der Ploeg, 2000) is a 
40-item self-report scale designed to measure two distinct anxiety concepts: state anxiety 
(A-state) and trait anxiety (A-trait). Item scores range from 1 to 4. Good validity is 
reported for the Dutch version of the STAI (Van der Ploeg, 2000). 
 
Beck Depression inventory (BDI-II). The BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996; 
Authorized Dutch Version: Van der Does, 2002) is a self-rating measure for severity of 
depression. It consists of 21 items measuring depressive symptoms, as defined by the 
DSM-IV (APA, 1994). Participants are asked to mark the statements that describe best 
how they felt during the 2 weeks prior to participation, with item scores ranging from 0 to 
3. Construct validity and reliability of the Dutch version are satisfactory (Van der Does, 
2002). 
 
2.2.2. Apparatus and Stimuli of the IST 
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The IST was conducted on IBM-compatible Pentium 4 personal computers with a 
17-in. screen, using E-prime Psychology Software Tools Inc. version 2.0 software 
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002).  
The stimuli of the IST were taken from the affective word list by Hermans and De 
Houwer (1994), which lists valence (1 = very negative, 7 = very positive) and familiarity 
(1 = not familiar at all, 7 = very familiar) ratings for 740 Dutch nouns and personality 
traits. We selected 12 negative and 12 neutral nouns, and 12 negative and 12 neutral 
personality traits, in such a way that stimuli did not differ in familiarity ratings or word 
length, t(47) < 1, ns. All neutral words had an affective rating between 3.5 and 5, and a 
familiarity rating of ≥ 3.4. All negative words had an affective rating of ≤ 3, and a 
familiarity rating of ≥ 3.4. The negative words we selected were related to fear of failure 
(e.g. exams) and relations (e.g. jealous), because these proved to be the 2 most frequent 
themes of worry in the sample of students that participated (based on a pilot study with a 
sample of undergraduates, N = 310). Words in white font, 7 mm high, were centrally 
presented against a black background. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
All participants first completed four questionnaires: the PSWQ, the RRS, the 
STAI, and the BDI-II. Based on the scores on the PSWQ and the RRS, participants were 
invited to participate in the actual computer experiment. After completing the informed 
consent form, the IST was carried out in individual testing cubicles of the psychology lab 
of the VUB. Each participant ran through two task versions in a counterbalanced order. In 
the emotional task version of the IST, participants were asked to keep a mental count of 
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the respective number of negative words and neutral words (without the use of external 
aids). In the non-emotional task version they were offered the same words, but they had 
to count nouns and personality traits.  
Each block of trials started with a fixation cross (1500 ms), and contained 10 up 
to 15 words, presented one at a time. The number of words varied across blocks to ensure 
that individuals could not infer the number of words in the categories by means of 
subtraction. The presentation of the words was self-paced: by pushing the enter-button 
participants indicated that they had (mentally) added the target word to the correct 
category in their working memory. They were asked to perform this update as fast as 
possible without sacrificing accuracy. The time interval between the presentation of a 
word and the following ‘enter’-response (reaction time) was recorded as dependent 
variable of task performance. After each ‘enter’-response, the screen was cleared and the 
next word appeared, with a fixed response-stimulus interval of 200 ms. At the end of 
each block, participants were asked to report the number of words they mentally counted 
in each category, using the number pad of the keyboard. In both the emotional and non-
emotional task version, participants completed 3 practice blocks followed by 12 
experimental blocks.  
Two types of count sequences were identified: a Switch (S) sequence, in which 
participants had to switch from one category to the other (e.g., a neutral word following a 
negative word), and a No Switch (NS) sequence, in which participants had to update the 
same category twice (e.g. a negative word following a negative word). Subtraction of 
response times of NS sequences from S sequences were taken as an index for the Internal 
Switching Cost (ISC; Garavan, 1998). In this way, higher index scores indicate higher 
Running head: PERSISTENT NEGATIVE THOUGHT AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
 
13 
switch cost, which is a reflection of reduced cognitive control. The order of presentation 




Through examination of the difference between RTs on S and NS sequences, we 
determined whether (1) worrying and (2) rumination were associated with an increased 
ISC. In order to minimize the influence of outliers, median RT scores were used. 
Accuracy was determined by the correct number of words in each category reported at 
the end of a block. On average 83% of the trials were correct or just +/- 1 away from the 
correct count. The exact distribution of the error rates is discussed below. To yield 
maximum power and to allow comparison with previous findings, all data, correct and 
incorrect, were included in the analyses (see De Lissnyder et al., 2012). 
 
3.1. High-worriers versus low-worriers 
3.1.1. Inclusion criteria. Based on their scores on the PSWQ, participants were 
divided into two groups: high-worriers (score > 57) and low-worriers (score < 38). High-
worriers and low-worriers did not differ significantly with respect to age, F(1, 44) = 0.33, 
p = .57. However, there were disproportionally more females in the high-worriers group 
than in the low-worriers group, χ²(1, 44) = 9.84, p = .002 (see Table 1). 
 
[Please, insert Table 1 here.] 
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3.1.2. ISC differences. For the analysis of RTs, we conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed 
ANOVA with Switch (S sequences, NS sequences) and Condition (emotional task 
version, non-emotional task version) as within-subjects factors and Worry (high-worriers, 
low-worriers) as between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed a main effect of Switch, F(1, 
44) = 166.34, p < .001, with RTs for NS sequences (M = 1275 ms, SD = 285) being lower 
than for S sequences (M = 1589 ms, SD = 345), indicating an overall switch cost. There 
was a main effect of Condition, F(1, 44) = 27.40, p < .001, revealing that performance 
was slower on the non-emotional task version (M = 1540 ms, SD = 363) as compared to 
the emotional task version (M = 1351 ms, SD = 275). A main between-subjects effect of 
Worry, F(1, 44) = 4.09, p =.049, indicated that high-worriers (M = 1535 ms, SD = 325) 
were generally slower than low-worriers (M = 1363 ms, SD = 250). More importantly, an 
interaction effect between Worry and Switch, F(1, 44) = 8.54, p = .005, indicated that the 
difference between S sequences and NS sequences, or the ISC, was greater for high-
worriers (M = 377 ms, SD = 198) than for low-worriers (M = 238 ms, SD = 119) (see 
Figure 1a.). Other main/interaction effects were not significant.
 
 
3.1.3. Error rates. In order to investigate the distribution of the error rates, we 
reran the analysis with accuracy as a dependent variable in a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with 
Condition (emotional task version, non-emotional task version) as within-subjects factor 
and Worry (high-worriers, low-worriers) as between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed a 
significant difference in accuracy between the non-emotional task version (M = 56%, SD 
= 22%) and the emotional task version (M = 48%, SD = 16%), F(1, 44) = 6.17, p = .017. 
Other main/interaction effects were not significant.  




3.1.4. Valence-specific ISC differences. To examine valence-specific effects, we 
calculated the ISC for sequences beginning with a negative word and sequences 
beginning with a neutral word, respectively named ISC negative
 
and ISC neutral. We 
define ISC negative as the difference in RT between negative-neutral (S) and negative-
negative (NS) sequences. ISC neutral is the difference in RT between neutral-negative 
(S) and neutral-neutral (NS) sequences. We then examined valence-specific differences 
within the emotional condition, using a 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Valence (ISC 
negative, ISC neutral) as within-subjects factor and Worry (high-worriers, low-worriers) 
as between-subjects factor. This was done in order to determine whether high-worriers 
exhibit a greater ISC than low-worriers when attention had to be diverted away from 
negative words, as opposed to neutral words. The analysis revealed a between-subjects 
effect of Worry, F(1, 44) = 10.40, p = .002, confirming that high-worriers (M = 407 ms, 
SD = 259) exhibited a greater ISC than low-worriers (M = 219 ms, SD = 115). Other 
main/interaction effects were not significant. There was no significant main effect of 
Valence or interaction effect of Valence and Worry. This means that there were no 
valence-specific differences in ISC for high-worriers versus low-worriers. 
 
3.1.5. Additional analyses. Because of the interrelation between worrying and 
anxiety, we also determined whether the ANOVA results remained significant when we 
controlled for anxiety, as measured using the State Anxiety scale of the STAI. The same 
analysis as above (3.1.2.) with State Anxiety as covariate¹, indicated that the covariate 
State Anxiety was unrelated to the ISC, F(1, 43) = 0.25, p = .944, r = .15. The effect of 
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Worry on the ISC remained significant after controlling for the effect of State Anxiety, 
F(1, 43) = 5.11, p = .029.  
Because of the correlation between scores on the PSWQ and RRS (r = .55, p < 
.001), we also conducted an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) with Rumination as 
covariate¹. The effect of Worry on the ISC remained significant after controlling for the 
effect of Rumination, F(1, 43) = 4.22, p = .021. 
Given the unequal distribution of male and female students among the low-
worriers group and high-worriers group, we conducted the same analysis as above 
(3.1.2.), but with Gender (male, female) as additional between-subjects factor. Results 
indicated that there was no interaction effect between Switch, Worry, and Gender, F(1, 
42) = 0.07, p = .790. Importantly, the effect of Worry on the ISC remained significant 
after controlling for the effect of Gender, F(1, 42) = 3.67, p = .050. 
Importantly, to determine the impact of personal relevance of worry themes, we 
added data from participants who worried about issues other than fear of failure and 
relationships, resulting in a total group of 63 participants (N = 30 low-worriers and N = 
33 high-worriers). We performed the same analysis as above (3.1.2.), but with one 
additional between-subjects factor: Personal Relevance (personally relevant negative 
words, non-personally relevant negative words). The analysis revealed an interaction 
effect of the factors Switch, Worry, and Personal Relevance, F(1, 59) = 10.98, p = .002. 
Further within-group comparisons with a Bonferroni post hoc test, confirmed that the 
results described above were only present when the negative stimuli were personally 
relevant, p < .05. The ISC was not significantly greater for high-worriers compared to 
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low-worriers when the negative words in the IST were not personally relevant (see Figure 
1).  
 
[Please, insert Figure 1 here.] 
 
3.2. High-ruminators versus low-ruminators 
3.2.1. Inclusion criteria. Based on their RRS scores, participants were divided 
into two groups: high-ruminators (score > 56) and low-ruminators (score < 35). High-
ruminators versus low-ruminators did not differ significantly with respect to age, F(1, 38) 
= 0.32, p = .580, or male/female ratio, χ ²(1, 38) = 3.74, p = .055 (see Table 2).  
 
[Please, insert Table 2 here.] 
 
3.2.2. Results rumination groups. Results for high-ruminators were entirely 
similar to those for high-worriers; therefore we only summarize the most important 
results.  
We conducted a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed ANOVA with Switch and Condition as within-
subjects factors and Rumination as between-subjects factor. Analysis revealed an 
interaction effect between Rumination and Switch, F(1, 38) = 7.62, p = .009, indicating 
that the ISC was greater for high-ruminators (M = 343 ms, SD = 194) than for low-
ruminators (M = 206 ms, SD = 188) (see Figure 1a.). When we controlled for Depression 
or Worry by entering them respectively as a covariate¹ and as an additional between 
subject variable¹ to the same analysis, the interaction Switch x Rumination remained 
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significant (respectively F(1, 37) = 6.02, p = .019 and F(1, 37) = 7.69, p = .009). When 
we added data from participants who worry about issues other than fear of failure and 
relationships and performed the same analysis with Personal Relevance as an additional 
between-subjects factor, analysis revealed an interaction effect of the factors Switch, 
Worry, and Personal Relevance, F(1, 54) = 4.12, p = .047. Further within-group 
comparisons with a Bonferroni post hoc test, confirmed that the interaction effect 
between Rumination and Switch was only present when the negative stimuli were 
personally relevant, p < .05 (see Figure 1). 
 
4. Discussion 
The present study investigated impaired cognitive control in worrying and 
rumination in relation to personal relevance of the stimuli. Using a new emotional version 
of the IST, we examined the ability of ruminators and worriers to switch between 
negative and neutral verbal stimuli in working memory, focusing on valence versus non-
affective characteristics. The results of the current study indicated that persistent negative 
thought in general (both worrying and rumination) is associated with reduced cognitive 
control. Importantly, these cognitive control impairments were only found when the 
negative stimuli of the IST were personally relevant for participants. We will discuss 
these findings in more detail below. 
In accordance with other studies (e.g. Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; 
Donaldson et al., 2007; De Lissnyder et al., 2010) and theoretical notions (Koster, De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011) this study confirms that reduced cognitive 
control is associated with rumination. Crucially, the results provide direct support for the 
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hypothesis that similar cognitive control impairments may play a role in worrying. To our 
knowledge, we are the first to demonstrate that worriers experience difficulties in 
updating and switching between internal representations in working memory. Our finding 
that worrying is associated with reduced cognitive control is therefore in line with the 
study by Brown (2009) indicating that worrying is negatively associated with cognitive 
control as displayed by inhibition impairments. 
An unexpected finding was that cognitive control impairments associated with 
persistent negative thought were not valence-specific, as (1) the effects were similar 
when the participants focused on emotional versus non-emotional characteristics of the 
stimulus material and as (2) there were no differences between shifting from negative to 
neutral as opposed to from neutral to negative words. However, although the valence of 
stimuli was not relevant for the task in the non-emotional task version, the same neutral 
and negative nouns and personality traits were used in both conditions. Notwithstanding 
that the specific operations we measure are unrelated to valence, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that performance was influenced by the presence of negative words in both 
task versions. Nevertheless, the general effect we found is in accordance with two other 
studies using non-emotional material, indicating that rumination is associated with 
overall shifting impairments (Davis & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Whitmer & Banich, 
2007). It is also in line with a study by De Lissnyder et al. (2010), which showed that 
shifting impairments were not valence-specific when participants were confronted with 
emotional and non-emotional material. In contrast, a recent study by De Lissnyder et al. 
(2012) using the same IST with facial expressions as stimuli, did find rumination to be 
associated with valence-specific shifting impairments. At present, it thus remains unclear 
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under what conditions general versus valence-specific impairments are observed in 
relation to persistent negative cognition. Future research clarifying this issue is necessary. 
Another important finding is that the ISC was only larger for ruminators and 
worriers when we solely included participants who indicated they worried about fear of 
failure and relationships. In other words, the negative stimuli in the IST had to be 
personally relevant to yield significant results. This is in agreement with other studies 
indicating that people react more strongly to personally relevant stimuli (Oathes et al., 
2011, Siegle et al., 2003). Since there were no significant valence-specific effects it is 
unlikely that the general larger switch cost is due to a reduced ability to divert attention 
away from these personally relevant negative stimuli. A more likely explanation for this 
finding could be that the use of personally relevant negative words induced negative 
thought, especially in worriers and ruminators. According to some theorists, worrying 
(Eysenck & Calvo, 1992) and rumination (Watkins & Brown, 2002) deplete cognitive 
resources. Consequently, the negative thought-induction might explain reduced cognitive 
control in worriers and ruminators as they had less cognitive resources to switch between 
internal representations, resulting in an overall reduced cognitive control unrelated to the 
valence of information. However, this is only one of the possible interpretations of these 
results. Future longitudinal research should explore the causal relationship between 
persistent negative thought and cognitive control. 
Importantly, the results of the present study show that cognitive control is related 
to persistent negative thinking, even after controlling for anxiety or depression. 
Moreover, there was no significant association between reduced cognitive control and 
mild symptoms of anxiety and depression, which is in line with some previous studies 
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showing a relationship between cognitive control and rumination, but not with depression 
(De Lissnyder et al., 2010; De Lissnyder et al., 2012; Whitmer & Banich, 2007). Yet, 
many other studies investigating the relationship between depression and cognitive 
control did find a negative correlation between these variables (e.g. Hertel, 2007; 
Joorman, 2004). Given that depressed individuals are generally characterized by high 
levels of rumination, the negative correlation between depression and cognitive control 
might be driven by the association between rumination and cognitive control. Possibly, 
the same goes for the relationship between worry, anxiety, and cognitive control. As far 
as we know, however, there are no other studies indicating that worry is a better predictor 
for reduced cognitive control than anxiety. On the contrary: a study by Verkuil, 
Brosschot, Putman, and Thayer (2009) indicated that worriers only show reduced 
cognitive control when they have high anxiety scores, and that they have enhanced 
cognitive control when anxiety is controlled for. In the current study, the limited number 
of participants with a high depression or anxiety score without a high rumination or 
worry score did not permit examining the exact relation between cognitive control and 
depression or anxiety. Future research could try to include more depressed or anxious 
participants without a tendency to perseverate in negative thoughts.  
Although rumination and worrying are generally thought to be two distinct 
cognitive processes, we found that ruminators and worriers exhibited highly similar 
cognitive control impairments. The present findings seem to be in line with the idea that 
rumination and worrying are similar processes of persistent negative thought, potentially 
subserved by similar cognitive mechanisms. Nevertheless, the relation between cognitive 
control and worry remained significant when controlling for rumination, and vice versa. 
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This suggests that despite their overlapping mechanisms, rumination and worry have 
specific additional relationships to cognitive control that should be further specified in 
future research.  If persistent thought in general is indeed the underlying vulnerability 
factor for developing both depression and/or anxiety disorders, this might be a possible 
explanation for the high co-morbidity between both disorders. Accordingly, it is crucial 
to further investigate the exact relationship between rumination, depression, worrying, 
and anxiety disorders, by studying why some individuals with a predisposition to 
perseverate in their thoughts become depressed and why others develop an anxiety 
disorder. In addition, if worrying and rumination are similar processes, it is advisable to 
use a more transdiagnostic approach to prevent depression and anxiety disorders by 
treating persistent negative thought. A better understanding of the reduced cognitive 
control mechanisms associated with persistent negative thought, and the conditions under 
which they occur, could be important for the development of therapeutic interventions 
that try to alter dysfunctional cognitive processing, such as cognitive bias modification. 
We believe it is important to note the fact that larger switch costs are not necessarily a 
disadvantage. In a study by Sheppes, Meiran, Gilboa-Schechtman, and Shahar (2008) 
healthy controls showed a larger switch cost to engage in negative thoughts when 
compared to dysphoric subjects, an effect that can be interpreted as a shield against 
negative thoughts.  
There are some limitations to this study that should be tackled in future research. 
First, we found that worry and rumination, the cognitive features of respectively anxiety 
and depression, were primarily related to cognitive control impairments, rather than 
anxiety and depression themselves. But since we conducted this study in an 
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undergraduate sample, our results might underestimate the association between 
depression or anxiety and cognitive control impairments. Therefore it is important to 
verify whether our results can be generalized to a clinical sample. Second, one could 
argue that the conclusion that worrying and rumination are both associated with cognitive 
control impairments is due to the fact that we tested for this association in a sample that 
partially consisted of the same individuals. In this respect, it is noteworthy that despite 
the overlap (38.71%) there also were unique individuals in each sample. The results also 
remained similar when we controlled for rumination in the worry analysis, and vice 
versa. Third, a limitation of our version of the IST was that the non-emotional task 
version (categorizing words as noun or personality trait) was more difficult than the 
emotional task version (categorizing words as neutral or negative). Follow-up studies 
should use equally difficult tasks. Fourth, because the study did not include positive 
words, possible positive valence-specific effects were not investigated. Fifth, a potential 
limitation of including only extreme groups is that the results do not inform us about 
participants with an average rumination or worry score. Sixth, all the measures used are 
based on self-report. Future studies should compare self-report persistent negative 
thought measures and, for example, persistent negative thought inductions. Finally, it is 
important to note that the present correlational study does not allow us to draw any causal 
conclusions about the relationship between cognitive control and persistent negative 
thought.  
In conclusion, we investigated the capacity of ruminators and worriers to switch 
between internal representations in working memory. The results of this study indicate 
that persistent negative thought is indeed associated with reduced cognitive control, but 
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only when the negative words used in the IST reflected personally relevant worry-themes 
for the participants. The current findings offer new insights into the underlying cognitive 
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Figure 1. ISC and SE as a function of Worry and Rumination for (a) only those 
participants for whom the stimuli are personally relevant (N = 62) and for (b) all 











































¹We determined normality of the data using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test, kurtosis, and 
skewness measures. Results indicated that rumination and anxiety scores were normally 
distributed in the high- and low-worry groups. Depression scores were also normally 
distributed in the high- and low-rumination groups. However, worry-scores were not 
normally distributed in the high- and low-rumination groups. Therefore we entered 
Depression as a covariate and Worry as an extra dichotomous (divided based on a 










High-worriers and low-worriers that worry about fear of failure and relations 
 female male age PSWQ score 
 N N M SD M SD 
high-worriers  19 3 19.64 3.72 65.27 5.31 
low-worriers  10 14 19.13 2.23 30.50 4.58 
total 29 17 19.37 3.01 47.13 18.23 
 




High-ruminators and low-ruminators that worry about fear of failure and relations 
 female male age RRS score 
 N N M SD M SD 
high- ruminators  15 3 19.39 4.12 65.11 5.28 
low-ruminators  12 10 18.82 2.17 32.41 1.99 
total  27 13 19.08 3.17 47.13 16.90 
 
Running head: PERSISTENT NEGATIVE THOUGHT AND COGNITIVE CONTROL 
 
36 
 
